

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2368

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11231

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DRAFTING GROUP MEETING NO. 229, JULY 20, 1978
(SALT TWO -1815)

SUMMARY. BEFORE MEETING, U.S. HANDED OVER NON-PAPER
EQUATING TERMS "ENCRYPTION" AND "SHIFROVANIYE," DEFINING
THEM AS METHOD EMPLOYED FOR PURPOSE OF CONCEALING INFOR-
MATION. SOVIETS DESCRIBED ISSUE AS "REDUNDANT" AND
"AGREED UPON" BUT PROMISED TO CONSIDER U.S. FORMULATION.
DURING MEETING U.S. TABLED REVISED JOINT STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES. SOVIETS POSED SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH
INDICATED CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF REMAINING ISSUES. END
SUMMARY.

1. IN PRIVATE MEETING BEFORE DRAFTING GROUP, MCNEILL
HANDED OVER TO KARPOV NON-PAPER EQUATING "ENCRYPTION" AND
"SHIFROVANIYE" AND OFFERING COMMON DEFINITION OF THOSE
TERMS. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. (BEGIN TEXT) WITH REGARD TO THE TERM "ENCRYPTION"/
"SHIFROVANIYE" AS USED IN THE SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING
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TO PARAGRAPH 3, ARTICLE XV, THE SIDES NOTE THAT THERE ARE
VARIOUS METHODS OF PROCESSING INFORMATION EMPLOYED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF EXPEDITING THE HANDLING AND TRANSMISSION OF
INFORMATION. "ENCRYPTION" OR "SHIFROVANIYE" IS NOT
EMPLOYED FOR THIS PURPOSE. "ENCRYPTION" OR "SHIFROVANIYE"
IS A METHOD OF PROCESSING INFORMATION, WHICH METHOD IS
EMPLOYED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONCEALING THAT INFORMATION

FROM OTHER THAN INTENDED RECIPIENTS. (END TEXT)

3. KARPOV PROMISED TO STUDY U.S. FORMULATION BUT CONTINUED TO CONSIDER QUESTION AS RESOLVED TO SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES LAST SEPTEMBER 15. FOR THE SOVIETS, IT WAS REDUNDANT. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE QUESTION WAS AGREED UPON. MCNEILL SAID THIS WAS U.S. VIEW AS WELL. PURPOSE OF U.S.-PROPOSED SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS TO MAKE THIS AGREEMENT EXPLICIT. KARPOV ASKED HOW THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GIVEN SIGNAL MIGHT BE REGULATED, DEPENDING ON THE TASK OF THAT SYSTEM OR THE TYPE OF TEST. WHERE WAS THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN ENCODING AND DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT? IF NO TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WAS TRANSMITTED FROM THE OBJECT BEING TESTED, WAS IT DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT? HE STRESSED THAT HIS QUESTIONS TOUCHED ON THE LEGAL DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN PERMITTED AND FORBIDDEN PRACTICES. AFTER REVIEWING U.S. PROPOSAL MCNEILL TOOK KARPOV'S QUESTIONS FOR STUDY, NOTING THAT THE TASK AT HAND WAS TO ESTABLISH LIMITS FOR FUTURE CONDUCT.

4. AFTER U.S. TABLED REVISION OF JOINT STATEMENT AND DRAFT JDT PAGE INCORPORATING FOOTNOTE RE TREATY/AGREEMENT, KARPOV HAD A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RE JOINT STATEMENT, THE FIRST DEALING WITH U.S. DELETION IN APPROPRIATE PLACES OF WORD "OFFENSIVE." WHAT WAS MEANT BY "STRATEGIC DEFENSES" BESIDES THOSE ALREADY DEALT WITH IN THE ABM TREATY? MCNEILL RECALLED FORMER EXPLICIT U.S. PROPOSAL ON STRATEGIC
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DEFENSES IN THIRD SECTION OF JOINT STATEMENT AND STATED THAT U.S. PROPOSAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH THIS CONCEPT WHICH LONG HAD BEEN ON TABLE. LIMITATIONS ON AIR DEFENSES AND CIVIL DEFENSES COULD BE DISCUSSED IN FUTURE, UNDER U.S. PROPOSAL. U.S. BELIEVED WE SHOULD NOT PREDETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME BY UNDULY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. KARPOV RESPONDED THAT IF U.S. PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED TO INCLUDE SUBJECTS SUCH AS AIR DEFENSES AND CIVIL DEFENSES, THE SOVIET POSITION ON THOSE QUESTIONS WAS UNCHANGED AND INVARIABLE, AND WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE ISSUE OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. TURNING TO SECTION ONE, KARPOV ASKED WHAT WAS MEANT BY "MEASURES TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN THE MUTUAL SECURITY OF PERMITTED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." MCNEILL REPLIED THAT IN SPEAKING OF THE SECURITY OF OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONS, THE SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE STATE REQUIRED THAT ITS DEFENSES BE SECURE. THIS WAS THE THRUST OF OUR REVISED LANGUAGE FOR SECTION ONE. HERE AGAIN, IN THE INTERESTS OF A POLITICAL DOCUMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, THE U.S. HAD REVISED THE LANGUAGE OF ITS PROPOSAL.

HOWEVER THE U.S. STILL BELIEVED THAT STRATEGIC STABILITY CAN BEST BE STRENGTHENED BY MEASURES WHICH INCLUDE THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE SURVIVABILITY OF PERMITTED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. KARPOV ASKED HOW U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD APPLY, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HEAVY BOMBERS. IF U.S. B-52'S SHOULD START AGING AND LOSE EFFECTIVENESS AS A SYSTEM, SHOULD THE SOVIETS AID IN RESTORING THEM TO THEIR FORMER

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ROLE? MCNEILL RESPONDED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS WERE AMONG THOSE ARMS WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED WOULD BE PERMITTED, AND WOULD OF COURSE BE COVERED BY THE U.S. PROPOSAL. BUT THE PURPOSE OF OUR PROPOSAL WAS TO ESTABLISH PRINCIPLE CALLING FOR CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE GENERAL, NOT SPECIFIC, AS THIS WAS. THE POINT WAS TO AVOID RULING OUT AT THIS TIME ANY SUBJECT THE SIDES MAY WISH TO RAISE IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS.

6. TURNING TO SECTION TWO, KARPOV ASKED WHAT THE PHRASE "SUPPLEMENTED, AS APPROPRIATE, BY AGREED COOPERATIVE MEASURES" MEANT. WAS VERIFICATION TO BE CARRIED OUT BY NTM WITH SOME MEASURES AGREED UPON TO STRENGTHEN AND ENHANCE NTM, OR WOULD NTM ONLY CONSTITUTE A PART OF THOSE MEASURES USED TO VERIFY? DID NTM STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET WITH COOPERATIVE MEASURES STANDING ON THEIR OWN FEET AS WELL, OR DID COOPERATIVE MEASURES SUPPLANT NTM? MCNEILL SAID HE BELIEVED FUTURE LIMITATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY BE MORE COMPLEX. THE PROVISION IN QUESTION OUGHT TO PROVIDE FOR

THIS, BY ALLOWING FOR COOPERATIVE MEASURES SUPPLEMENTING
NTM. WHAT WE HAD IN MIND DID NOT RESULT IN COOPERATIVE
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MEASURES SUPPLANTING NTM, AND OUR PROPOSAL WAS CLEAR AND
FREE FROM AMBIGUITY. KARPOV QUESTIONED USE OF WORD
"SUPPLEMENTED," AND EXTEMPORANEOUSLY PROPOSED FOLLOWING
ORAL REFORMULATION:

7. "...AND, AS APPROPRIATE, COOPERATIVE MEASURES CONTRI-
BUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
ALSO WILL BE TAKEN BY THE PARTIES."

8. SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF REVISED U.S.
PROPOSAL FOR JOINT STATEMENT AT SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING GROUP
MEETING.

9. NEXT MEETING TUESDAY, JULY 25. EARLE.

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